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 Executive Summary 
In 2009, two epidemiologists, Wilkinson and Pickett, published a book entitled “The Spirit Level, Why More Equal 
Societies Almost Always Do Better” in which they claim that inequality and its acute perception by the average EU 
citizen is a toxic element of today’s European societies and one that seems to be associated with decreased levels of 
trust, civic engagement and participation, as well as to a host of other social challenges from poor health to crime, to 
underage pregnancies. Despite Wilkinson and Pickett’s intuitively convincing story of the link between higher 
income inequality and worse social outcomes, the empirical tests are based on simple bivariate correlations, 
implying that the authors fail to control for all the other numerous factors, which might have had an impact on both 
the social outcomes and income inequality. In doing so, the empirical associations reported in their book are likely 
to lead to misleading causal inferences. Nonetheless, Wilkinson and Pickett’s book attracted a lot of attention and 
called for a more careful analysis of the consequences of rising income inequality 
 
The aim of this report is, hence, to look into sound empirical studies - based on multivariate analysis - which 
examine the effect of income inequality on important social outcomes related to (i) well-being, (ii) criminality, (iii) 
health, (iv) social capital, (v) education, (vi) political participation and (vii) female labor market participation. The 
upshot of this literature review is that higher criminality, reduced political agency and, to some extent, lower social 
capital formation and well-being appear to be tangible illustrations of the wastage produced by rising income 
inequality. In addition, there are a number of self-reinforcing loops linked to inequality. A clear illustration of this is 
the role of inequality in reducing the voting participation of the low income groups and the concomitant 
consequences in terms of redistributive policies and therefore on income disparities. 
 
In more detail, the literature review has highlighted the following elements: 
 
1) The effect of income inequality on happiness critically depends on the perceived mobility in a country. If 
income mobility is high, such as in the USA, income inequality tends to be positively associated with 
reported well-being as individuals tend to consider that they will eventually reach a higher income. The 
opposite is observed in low mobile countries (i.e. typically in European countries) because in those 
countries individuals feel that it is impossible to reach a higher level of income.  
 
2) The majority of the studies focusing on the relationship between the income distribution and criminality 
conclude in favor of a detrimental effect of income inequality on criminal behaviors. The rationale 
behind these findings might be based on economic considerations – income inequality increases the gain 
derived from a criminal act –and/or on a sentiment of frustration of the less well-off individuals when 
they compare their situation with respect to the wealthier ones. 
 
3) Empirical analyses of the harmful effect of income inequality on health are usually not conclusive, at 
least among wealthier European countries. This goes in line with the fact that there is still not a widely 
accepted rationale for explaining why income inequality should impact on health. Furthermore, several 
scholars tend to suggest that the causality runs in the other way, from health status to income inequality.  
 
4) In virtue to the aversion to heterogeneity theory, heterogeneous societies should be characterized by 
fewer contacts and in consequence, by lower levels of social capital. This prediction, also confirmed by 
adjacent theories, appears to be empirically validated by cross-country studies as well as by those 
focusing on the US context. Findings specific to EU countries are limited and less conclusive. 
 
5) The relationship between income inequality and educational attainment might go in both directions. On 
one hand, rising inequality should encourage investments in education through increased returns to 
education. On the other hand, it might prevent these investments for those people belonging to the 
bottom of the income distribution because of resources’ constraints. Regarding the latter mechanism, the 
empirical studies reviewed suggest a modest effect or no effect of income on educational outcomes. 
However, when interpreting these results caution is needed, because conclusions rely strongly on the 
econometric approach used by the researchers.  
 
6) The relationship between turnout and inequality is likely to be mutually reinforcing because, according 
to the class-bias assumption, the benefits from voting are lower for the low-income group, reducing the 
incentive for this fringe of the population to vote. If voter turnout is skewed by income, the policies 
implemented with favor the well-off group (median voter hypothesis), thus participating to the 
intensification of income disparities. In turn, rising economic inequality will discourage participation 
among low-income groups, and so on. These predictions are confirmed by the majority of cross-country 
and single-country based studies.   
 
7) There is neither a sound theoretical base nor empirical evidence of an effect of income inequality on the 
participation rate of women in the labor force. The causality is found to run instead from labor force 
participation of women to income inequality. 
 
This report is a first step of a more comprehensive project aiming at analyzing the socio-consequences of rising 
income inequalities in Europe, and will be complemented with quantitative analyses of the relationship between 
income inequality and the social outcomes cited above. 
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Glossary 
 
Account/Control for observed country or individual characteristics: hold fixed (constant) the value of the 
observed country or individual characteristics. 
 
Cross-sectional data: Data composed of multiple units such as countries, (but also regions, individuals, and 
households) observed at a given point in time. 
 
Endogeneity: When we employ the term endogeneity of the economic inequality indicator we refer to the reverse 
causation and/or omitted variables issues addressed in the section 2 of this report. 
  
GMM (Arellano Bond): Generalized method of moments. This estimation method allows dealing with the 
endogeneity of the social outcome. To be implemented, it requires panel data. 
 
IV estimates: Instrumental variables estimates. This estimation method allows dealing with the endogeneity of the 
social outcome (see box 1 for the definition of instrument) 
 
OLS estimates: Ordinary least squares. 
 
Pooled Cross Sectional data: Data that combine cross-sectional and time series features. For instance, two cross 
country surveys, in two different years. 
 
Panel data: Data composed of time series information for each cross sectional unit (such as households followed 
over time). The particularity of panel data, with respect to pooled cross-sectional data is the fact that the same units 
are followed over a given period of time. 
 
Time series data: Data composed of a series of observations over time for a specific unit (country, region, etc.) 
  
1. Introduction 
 
In the past years, there has been a growing concern about the rising income inequalities with particularly stark rises 
in inequality in the US and also substantial widening of the income gap in Europe. The relevance of the widening of 
income has not only caught the political and scholarly attention but is heavily discussed nowadays on the streets, 
with most prominent manifestation of such protests being the ‘Occupy Wall Street’- movement. This movement and 
its widely-cited slogan “We are the 99%” (see for instance the reporting of the movement by the New York Times, 
2011, and also the web blog “We are the 99 percent”, 2012) refers specifically to a growing unequal distribution of 
wealth.  
 
The development of income inequality in the EU member states has been the subject of a recent publication by the 
OECD (2011). Surveying the development of income inequality over the past 3 decades reveals an interesting 
picture. In particular, there seems to be a general trend of widening the income gap starting in the 1980s. While in 
the 1980s the Gini coefficient was 0.29 it markedly rose to 0.32 in the late 2000s (ibid., p. 22). Particularly striking 
is the increase in income inequality of former ‘equal societies’, such as the Nordic countries and Germany. In 
general, there seems to be a convergence trend towards a generally higher level of income inequality.  
 
The causes of this rising income inequality in the past decades has also attracted much political and scholarly 
attention. The OECD’s (2011) report provides a wealth of explanatory mechanisms, ranging from rising wage 
inequality to different taxation policies and household structures. 
 
A different perspective to look at the rise in income inequality is the question what the consequences of rising 
income inequalities in the EU are, i.e. why should we care about the widening of the income gap? And which direct 
consequences should we expect from a greater divide between the 1% and the 99% of the population? These 
questions gained prominence through a widely cited book by Wilkinson and Pickett entitled “The Spirit Level, Why 
More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better” (2009). Although their main proposition, i.e. more equal societies 
perform better on a wide range of social outcomes, is intuitive and straightforward, they are not able to provide 
convincing empirical evidence for their propositions. Nevertheless, their work initiated a more careful analysis of 
the consequences of income inequality.  
 
To further the discussion on the impact of rising income inequality on various social outcomes, this report provides 
a literature review on the relationships between income inequality and important social outcome variables. The 
main social outcome variables considered in this literature review are in the area of happiness, criminality, health, 
social capital (trust), education, voting behavior and female labor participation.  
 
This report is organized as follows: In section 2, we will briefly describe some technical terms and methodological 
issues that are meant to ease the reading of the literature review. Section 3 is dedicated to the literature review as 
such. This section includes, for each social outcome variable, a description of the rationale on why income 
inequality is expected to affect this social outcome variable. We then discuss the most relevant empirical studies 
linking income inequality to the social outcome under investigation. We also include, for each individual social 
outcome variable, a summary table with all relevant studies considered in this report. These summary tables contain 
information on the data and time coverage, variables and econometric methods employed, as well as the main 
results of the studies discussed in the literature review.  
  
2. Reciprocal relationships between inequality and social outcomes 
 
Any discourse on the detrimental effect of rising economic inequality
1
 should be based on sound scientific 
evidence. However, obtaining convincing evidence is far from being an easy task. As a precondition, relevant data 
on economic inequality and social outcomes have to be gathered. Then, we need to identify the causal effect of 
economic inequality, i.e. what would happen to some social outcomes (health, criminality, etc.) if inequality were to 
increase, everything else being kept constant.  
 
Why bivariate analysis might be misleading: 
A bivariate correlation, between two variables, Y (a social outcome, here the dependent variable) and X (economic 
inequality, here the independent variable) allows testing the hypothesis of an association between these two 
variables. However, it is important to understand that simply finding that two variables are correlated is not enough 
to conclude that a change in X causes a change in Y. There are various circumstances, where we could find a 
significant correlation between Y and X, however, we could not conclude from this that X is causing changes in Y. 
This will be the case in a context of:  
 
Reciprocal relationship & reverse causation: in such a case, it might be the case, that X causes Y or Y causes 
X or the relationship might be reciprocal, i.e. X causes Y and Y causes X).  
 
Omitted variables: this happens when Y has more than one cause (X but also other factors Z). If the effect of 
Z on Y is not taken into account, the estimated bivariate correlation between X and Y will unintentionally 
also capture the association between Z and Y.
2
 It might be also the case that the variables X and Y are 
related to each other only indirectly, through another variable Z. The bivariate correlation between Y and X 
will spuriously conduct us to conclude that X causes Y (or Y causes X) while in fact it is not the case.  
 
Because of these limitations, evidence-based policy should not be based on mere bivariate correlations. Therefore, 
the literature review presented in the current document will not report or discuss studies uniquely relying on 
bivariate statistics.   
 
Multivariate analysis: the notion of ceteris paribus  
Causal inference is based on the fundamental notion of ceteris-paribus, which means “other (relevant) factors being 
equal”, i.e. how will Y move if X changes, holding everything else constant. A multivariate analysis allows us to 
explore relationships between variables precisely in the ceteris paribus fashion. Put it differently, multivariate 
regressions makes it possible (i) to observe different factors that can simultaneously affect the dependent variable Y 
and (ii) to estimate the independent influence of each of the factors, i.e. while maintaining the value of the other 
factors fixed. Multivariate analyses is thus ideal to eliminate or reduce the omitted variable bias insofar as it is 
                                                        
1
 Note that we use economic inequality and income inequality as synonymous throughout the report. 
2
 This is true insofar Z is simultaneously correlated with X and Y. 
possible to control for all relevant variables that simultaneously affect economic inequality and the social outcome 
under investigation.
3
 The capacity to control for all (available) relevant factors largely depends on the quality of 
the database at the disposal of the researchers as well as of the estimation method employed. This is especially 
important when interrelated social variables are considered. 
 
In the present literature review, we have focused our attention on papers based on multivariate analysis and 
published in academic journals (or which have been recently produced). Furthermore, we paid particular 
attention to studies that “control” for a large number of factors that are known to influence the social outcome under 
investigation. Most of the papers reviewed do not address the issue of reverse causality which might constitute a 
critical problem for some of the social outcomes (for instance, education or health). Consequently, we have also 
made a particular effort to emphasize studies that attempt to tackle this issue of reverse causality while employing 
appropriate econometrics methods (see BOX 1 for an example). 
  
                                                        
3
 However, if there are some important factors explaining Y that are not observable for the researchers, then it will not be possible to 
measure how the social outcome changes if inequality rises, while keeping these unobserved factors constant. 
BOX1: 
Multivariate analysis: practical example 
Suppose that we want to explore the effect of income inequality at the country level on individual voting behavior 
in Europe. We have at our disposal a dataset which contains for each EU country some information on electoral 
turnout at the last national election, the country level income inequality as well as some additional information on 
country characteristics (such as the unemployment rate, education attainment, welfare systems characteristics etc.) 
for the year 2005. 
 
A multivariate regression will take the following form: 
 
                                       (1) 
 
where    is a variable measuring the electoral turnout at the last national election for country i (i=1,…,27) while    
is the level of income inequality in country i and   are a set of other country characteristics (unemployment rate, 
education attainment, welfare systems characteristics etc) that are expected to impact on voting behavior.    is the 
intercept,    is the parameter associated with   , i.e. income inequality,    the parameter associated with   and so 
on. All parameters have to be estimated.  
 
The estimated parameter    will inform about the causal effect of economic inequality on voting behavior if and 
only if (i) there are no important explanatory variables missing in the equation (1) that simultaneously affect income 
inequality and the social outcome and if (ii) there is no reverse causality issue. 
 
To deal with the omitted variable problem, the first solution is to include all variables that are relevant for 
explaining      Unfortunately, it is not always possible as some of these variables are not observable. For instance, 
the country voting system might affect current voting behavior and also relate to the current level of income 
inequality. If this is not controlled for the estimated parameter associated with income inequality,       will be biased 
and hence, over- or under-estimating the impact of    on   . 
 
Sometime it is possible to exploit some specific features of the dataset to account for those factors that are not 
observable. For instance, suppose that we have the same dataset (a panel) for two years e.g. 2005 and 2009. Such a 
data structure allows us to control for all time invariant factors at the country level (in the example above, the 
specific country voting system but also all the other country characteristics that are time-invariant) by introducing as 
additional covariate “unit fixed effects”. In our example, this would mean to introduce “country fixed effects” (or 
country dummies). The intuition is the following: by including country fixed effect, the estimated parameter    will 
provide an estimate of the average effect of income inequality within each country, i.e. the average effect of a 
change of income inequality on the change in electoral participation. Along the same line of reasoning, if we work 
with a panel dataset composed of individuals or regions followed over time, it is possible to respectively include 
individual or region-fixed effects in order to account for all individual and regional time invariant characteristics. 
 
Several techniques exist to deal with the reverse causality issue. The instrumental variables (IV) estimator is one 
technique, often mentioned in the summary tables. The IV estimator is carried out by regressing the two following 
equations: 
 
 ̂                                          (2) 
           ̂                                  (3) 
 
Where the equation (2) is a multivariate regression explaining the endogenous variable   , the income inequality 
measure, and    is the so-called instrument, a variable which correlates with    but is directly unrelated with   . 
After estimating equation (2), the predicted values of the inequality measure,  ̂ , are used in place of    in the 
estimation of equation (3). Following the example above, such procedure allows to identify the direction of 
causality, going from inequality to voting behavior by using only part of the variability in the inequality variable, 
specifically the part that is directly correlated with the   . 
The choice of the instrument is the most crucial step in the implementation of this method, and should be carefully 
motivated by economic intuition or theory. Good instruments are often created by policy change, or exogenous 
shocks to the endogenous variable. 
 
3. Literature review 
3.1 Income inequality and happiness 
3.1.1 Rationale 
The discussion on whether income inequality affects an individual’s happiness dates back to theoretical 
considerations on relative deprivation and relative utility and refers to the idea that people’s utility depends not only 
on their own income but also on their relative position in the society (van de Stadt, Kapteyn and van de Geer, 1985).  
In addition, some scholars suggest that individuals can have a ‘taste for equality’. In particular, Thurow (1971, 
p.327) proposes that “the individual is simply exercising an aesthetic taste for equality or inequality similar in 
nature to a taste for paintings”.  
 
An intuitive and comprehensive explanation of the impact of income inequality on individuals’ well-being is 
provided by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973). These authors use the analogy of a traffic jam on a two-lane 
motorway to explain the effect of income inequality on happiness and call this the ‘tunnel effect’ (ibid, p.545):  
 
“Suppose that I drive through a two-lane tunnel, both lanes going the same direction, and run into a serious 
traffic jam. No car is moving in either lane as far as I can see (which is not very far). I am in the left lane and 
feel dejected. After a while the cars in the right lane begin to move. Naturally, my spirits lift considerably, 
for I know that the jam has been broken and that my lane’s turn to move will surely come any moment now. 
[…] But suppose that the expectation is disappointed and only the right lane keeps moving: in that case I 
[…] will at some point become quite furious.” 
 
This analogy nicely illustrates several important aspects in the relationship between income inequality and 
happiness. First, inequality may convey information about future prospects. This means that if I observe that the 
people around me are moving, then I expect to be able to move upward soon too. This suggests that income 
inequality might have a positive effect on individuals’ wellbeing.  
 
Second, the positive impact of inequality might turn negative if these expectations are not fulfilled, i.e. if my lane is 
still not moving. This has important consequences for countries in different development stages and there is 
empirical evidence on transition countries supporting this notion (as discussed below).  
 
Last, the question arises at what point people do get ‘upset’ about their lane not moving. This refers to people’s 
beliefs on whether mobility is possible in their country and how difficult it is for people to move upwards.  
 
In conclusion, income inequality might affect positively the individual’s level of happiness if people perceive that in 
their society upward mobility is possible. However, if individuals think that it is very unlikely to reach a higher 
income, then income inequality will probably impact negatively on happiness. 
3.1.2 Measures of happiness and income inequality 
 
The empirical studies measure happiness by relying on questions directly asking respondents on their perceived 
happiness or their life satisfaction. For example, the studies use the responses to the following questions: 
- “Taken all together, how would you say are things these days – would you say you are very happy, pretty happy, 
or not too happy?” (from the United States General Social Survey) 
- “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you 
lead?” (from the Euro-barometer Survey Series) 
- “How satisfied are you with your life all things considered?” (from the German Socio-economics Panel Study) 
 
There are two different ways on how income inequality is measured in the studies focusing on happiness. First, 
most of the studies rely on the Gini coefficient or on alternative indices such as the Theil, Atkinson or Stark index 
(cf. Alesina et al., 2004, and Schwarze and Harpfer, 2007). Second, studies frequently employ the ‘reference group 
income’, which is designed to capture the income of peers (defined by e.g. occupation, education level, sex, age and 
region), following the idea that people strive to ‘keep[..] up with the Joneses’ (cf. Hopkins, 2008, p.4). For studies 
employing the “reference group income” variable, see Luttmer (2005), Clark (2006), Grosfeld and Senik, (2008). 
 
3.1.3 Empirical evidence 
 
There exists quite substantial empirical evidence on the impact of income inequality on happiness or life 
satisfaction, mainly covering the U.S., Europe and transition countries.  
 
The empirical evidence confirms the relationship between income inequality, happiness and social mobility. The 
effect of income inequality on happiness critically depends on whether individuals perceive the society to open to 
upward mobility and on whether it is likely that they will eventually be able to reach higher income levels. Evidence 
can thus be divided into the low-mobile countries (typically European), where inequality has a negative effect on 
satisfaction, and the highly mobile society such as US and transition countries, where there seems to be a greater 
variability in the outcomes of income inequality.  
 
For European countries, Senik (2006) finds that inequality has a negative effect on life satisfaction. Alesina et al. 
(2004) show that this result is driven by the detrimental effect of income inequality on people with low income and 
to those belonging to the left ideological spectrum. On the contrary, richer individuals seem indifferent about 
income inequality.  
 
For Germany, Schwarze and Harpfer (2007) find that income inequality has a negative effect on life satisfaction 
while Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) show that the higher the income of the reference group is, the lower is the level of 
happiness. Clark (2006) reports similar findings for Britain while using life satisfaction as the outcome. 
Additionally, Clark (2006) argues that higher income inequality within the reference group actually increases life 
satisfaction. The latter effect might convey some form of ‘opportunity’ feeling similar to some of the findings in the 
U.S.  
 
The evidence for the U.S. is somewhat mixed. Senik (2006) finds that in contrast to the evidence from Europe, 
inequality in the U.S. has a positive effect on life satisfaction. This result is challenged by evidence provided by 
McBride (2001), Luttmer (2005), and Dynan and Ravina (2007). These scholars report that a higher ‘reference 
group income’ negatively affects happiness. A more nuanced view is provided by Alesina et al. (2004), who 
investigate different income levels and incorporate the political preferences of individuals. Their finding is that in 
the U.S. it is the rich people, who are particularly unhappy about higher levels of income inequality, whereas the 
poor are indifferent to inequality. Hence, some of the contrasting evidence might be explained by different samples 
of individuals.  
 
Last, several studies exist on the impact of inequality on happiness in transition countries. While Sanfey and Teksoz 
(2005) show that inequality has a negative impact on life satisfaction in various transition countries, Senik (2006) 
conclude that the income of the reference group and the level of satisfaction are positively related in transition 
countries. Moreover, the author provides evidence that this effect is particularly strong for younger people, i.e. 
below 41 years, and for individuals, who experienced higher income volatility. Similarly, for Russia, Senik (2004) 
finds a positive impact of ‘reference group income’ on life satisfaction and no significant effect for income 
inequality. The variability of the results is confirmed in Grosfeld and Senik (2008)’s study on Poland. Here, the 
authors find that there has been a major structural change in the perception of income inequality after 1997. Before 
1997, income inequality is positively associated with life satisfaction and individual’s expectations about the future. 
After 1997, however, income inequality is not significantly associated anymore with life satisfaction. This is 
explained by the perception of Polish people that they were not benefitting from the economic transformation.  
 
In conclusion, empirical evidence strongly suggests that the perception of income inequality as a negative force in 
the society depends critically on the perceived country mobility and might differ by income group, political 
preferences, and age. For Europe, a negative impact of income inequality or of the ‘reference group income’ on 
happiness is observed. Transition between political regimes may render the association inequality/happiness 
positive or negative in time depending on the level of expectation raised and their possible fulfillment or delusion.   
Table 1: Studies on income inequality and happiness 
  
Author Data Inequality measure 
(INE) 
Main outcome (O) 
Method Results 
Alesina, Di 
Tella, & 
MacCulloch, 
2004 
US, individuals 
Period: 1981-1996 
 
12 European 
countries, individuals, 
1975-1992 
INE: Gini 
O: Happiness or life 
satisfaction 
Ordered probit, state and year 
dummies, robust standard 
errors 
Overall inequality found to decrease happiness.  
However, strong differences between US and 
Europe: in the US, the rich are unhappy about 
inequality and poor are indifferent while in 
Europe the poor and leftist individuals care 
about inequality and rich are indifferent. 
Dynan & 
Ravina, 2007 
US, individuals, 
1979-2004 
 
INE: relative income 
measure: own group 
income – other people’s 
income 
O: Happiness 
Pooled OLS Happiness is higher if income of own group is 
higher than the income of other people  
Schwarze & 
Harpfer, 2007 
West Germany, 
individuals 
1985-1998 
INE: Gini, Theil and 
Atkinson, - income 
quintile 
O: Life satisfaction 
Ordered probit, region and 
time fixed effects and 
individual random effects, 
robust standard errors (and 
also pooled OLS and panel 
fixed effects) 
Inequality: negative effect on life satisfaction, 
but only when measured with Gini or Theil, not 
for Atkinson  
Relative income position (income quintile): no 
impact on life satisfaction 
Clark A. E., 
2006 
Britain, individuals, 
1991-2002 
 
INE: Gini based on 
reference group income 
O: Life satisfaction and 
the GHQ-12 
 
Ordered probit, clustered 
standard errors (but also panel 
random effects, fixed effects 
logit and random effects 
probit) 
Reference group income has a negative impact 
on life satisfaction. Life satisfaction 
is positively related to reference group income 
inequality.  
Grosfeld & 
Senik, 2008 
Poland, individuals, 
1992-2005 
INE: Gini, reference 
group income 
O: Life satisfaction and 
private expectations of 
the future 
Ordered logit, year and region 
dummies, clustered standard 
errors (and sup-Wald test) 
Both satisfaction and expectations of the future 
are positively influenced by inequality up to 
1997. Afterwards, inequality has no effect on 
expectations and has a negative effect on 
satisfaction. Similar results when the income of 
the reference group is used.  
Sanfey & 
Teksoz, 2005 
19 European countries 
1981-84,1990-93, 
1995-97, 1999-2002 
INE: Gini 
O: Life satisfaction 
Ordered probit, country 
dummies 
High inequality is associated with lower life 
satisfaction for transition countries and with 
higher life satisfaction for non-transition 
countries. 
Senik, 2006 European countries, 
transition countries, 
US, individuals 
 
INE: reference income 
and surplus of 
individual income 
beyond reference 
income   
O: Life satisfaction 
Conditional fixed effects logit, 
time dummies (also ordered 
probit model) 
Inequality is negative for ‘old’ European 
countries and positive in post-transition 
economies and the US 
 
Luttmer, 2005 US, individuals,  
1987-88, 1992-94 
INE: Reference income 
in the neighborhood 
O: Happiness 
Pooled OLS, state, survey 
wave, and individual fixed 
effects (also ordered probit) 
Higher reference earnings are associated with 
lower levels of happiness 
Senik, 2004 Russia, individuals, 
1994-2000 
INE: Reference group 
income, Gini 
O: Life satisfaction 
Ordered probit with Mundlak 
transformation of exogenous 
variables or individual fixed 
effects, and year and region 
fixed effects 
Reference group’s income has a positive effect 
on satisfaction. Inequality indices do not affect 
individual satisfaction. 
 
McBride, 2001 US, individuals 
 1994, and 1972, 1977, 
1982, 1986, 1992 and 
1996 
INE: reference group 
income 
O: Happiness 
Ordered probit Reference group income has a negative effect 
on happiness.  
Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 
2005 
Germany, individuals, 
1992-1997 
INE: reference group 
income, distance 
between the individual’s 
own and the reference 
group income 
O: Life satisfaction 
Ordered probit, fixed time 
effects and individual random 
effects incorporating Mundlak 
transformation 
Reference group income has a negative impact 
on happiness. Individuals are happier the larger 
their income is in comparison to the reference 
group.  
3.2 Income inequality and criminality 
 
3.2.1 Rationale 
 
The determinants of criminality, and in particular the role played by income inequality, has attracted the attention of 
scientists from various disciplines.  
 
Economic theories for criminal activities date back to Becker (1968) and stress that a criminal act is the result of a 
rational decision based on a cost-benefit analysis. Individuals decide to participate or not in criminal activities by 
comparing the returns of criminal and legal activities. The net return of a criminal act is the difference between the 
loot and the associated costs such as the opportunity cost and the severity of punishment if the individual is caught 
while committing the crime. Income inequality should increase the potential gain derived from a criminal act for 
individuals situated at the bottom end of the income distribution because the gap between their income and the 
country mean income is larger, relatively to a situation in which the resources would be more evenly distributed.   
 
Sociological theories sustain that criminal activities result from a feeling of frustration of the less well-off people 
when they compare their situation with respect to the one of wealthier individuals. The higher is income inequality, 
the greater is the sentiment of unfairness of disadvantaged individuals. Economic deprivation and the associated 
feeling of resentment might spur criminal behaviors (Morgan, 2000, citing, in particular, Merton’s work, 1938). 
 
3.2.2 Measures of criminality and income inequality 
 
Typically, crime statistics used in empirical studies refers to homicide, robbery and property crime rates. However, 
most of these official data sources suffer from under-reporting, with some categories of crime more particularly 
afflicted by errors than others (MacDonald, 2002).  Homicide and robbery rates tend to be more reliable figures 
since the violence associated with such criminal acts tend to increase the proclivity for the victim to officially 
declare the crime to the police. Cross-country comparisons are also often problematic because of legal differences 
across countries in the way crimes are defined. In addition, the quality of the data strongly depends on the country-
specific police and justice systems (Fajnzylber et al, 2002a). 
 
The Gini coefficient is the measure of economic inequality employed in all empirical papers reviewed below. 
However, some studies use additional inequality indices (ratio of income of the richest to the poorest quintile, 
proportion of the population with an income below a certain value) to check the robustness of the findings (see 
Nilsson, 2004, Brush, 2007, Fajnzylber et al, 2002a). 
 
 
3.2.3 Empirical evidence 
 
Empirical studies 
Testing the causal effect of inequality on crime rates is not straightforward because several socioeconomic factors 
are likely to be simultaneously correlated with income inequality and criminal rates. If these factors are not 
controlled for in the multivariate setting, we cannot conclude that the estimated association between economic 
inequality and criminality is causal. The fact that crime rates are measured with errors also complicates the work of 
researchers in particularly if these measurement errors are not random but are, instead, correlated with other 
variables related themselves to income inequality.  Dealing with the problems cited above, i.e. with the 
“endogeneity” of the inequality index, is critical to be able to say something about the causal effect of income 
inequality on crime rates.  
 
Empirical papers examining the effect of income inequality on crime rates are based on (i) cross-country data or (ii) 
single country data. Country-specific studies can be of two types: the first one only relies on cross-sectional 
information (i.e. cross-region) whilst the second type of study combines cross-sectional data with time series 
information (i.e. cross-region observed over two or more periods of time).   
 
Cross-country studies 
Using data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, Fajnzylber et al. (2002a) examine the determinants of 
national criminal rates across a sample of around 40 countries and on a 40 years period. The authors show that 
income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, exerts a positive and significant effect on homicide and 
robbery rates, and these results are robust to the inclusion of a large set of control variables and to alternative 
econometric methods. In a companion paper, Fajnzylber et al. (2002b) find that the effect of income inequality on 
violent crime is robust to alternative measures of income inequality such as the ratio of income of the richest to the 
poorest quintile of the population, which is an index of income polarization. 
 
Single-country studies 
Country-specific studies have mainly been based on US data. Back in 1973, Ehrlich, in his analysis of state crime 
determinants, finds a positive association between property crime and inequality as measured by the percentage of 
the population with an income below one half of the median income. Recent studies on US data show contrasting 
results. Kelly (2000), using data from the 1991 FBI uniform crime reports on urban counties, concludes that 
inequality has a substantial positive effect on property crime but does not relate to violent crime. The conclusions of 
both studies must be treated with care because the empirical analyses are based on cross-sectional data, which 
prevents the authors to control for time-invariant local effect. If the time-invariant local effects are correlated with 
both criminality rates and income inequality, the estimated effect of income inequality might be spurious. The two 
studies cited below deal with this methodological issue (Brush, 2007 and Choe, 2008).  
 
Brush (2007) using data at the county level over the period 1994-2000, observes that with ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates, income inequality displays a negative coefficient while first-differenced estimates (i.e. the 
variables in the model are not expressed in level but in changes from one period to the next) show an opposite or 
non-significant effect. On the other hand, Choe (2008), using criminal information at the state level, over a longer 
period (1995-2004) concludes that once area time invariant specific effects and the “endogeneity” of inequality are 
taking into account, income inequality increases burglary and robbery rates. 
 
Studies on EU countries are far more limited. Nilsson (2004), with Swedish counties data for the period 1973-2000 
finds that property crime is positively related to relative poverty, as measured by the proportion of the population 
with an income below a certain percentage (10, 20 or 30%) of the mean income. However Nilsson (2004) does not 
observe any effect of relative poverty on crime. These results hold with county and time fixed effects. Tthe author 
notes that the empirical findings vary with the inequality measures and that while relative poverty matters for 
property crime, it is not the case with inequality measures that consider the entire income distribution (such as the 
Gini coefficient). 
 
Machin and Meghir (2004) examine the role of wage variations at the bottom of the wage distribution on property 
and vehicle crimes in the UK between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s. Including area-specific effects as well as time 
effects, the authors conclude that the lower is the 25th percentile wage, the higher is the probability to observe 
criminal activities.  
 
In conclusion, the majority of the papers reviewed suggest that income inequality increases criminal behaviors. 
More precisely, cross-country studies and country specific studies of the first type conclude that income inequality 
is positively associated with criminal behaviors while, country specific studies of the second type tend to produce 
more mixed results. 
  
Table 2: Studies on income inequality and criminality 
 
  
Topic Data Inequality measure (INE) 
Main outcome (O) 
Method Results 
Fajnzylber 
et al, 2002a 
Panel data: cross 
country & time 
series  
40 countries  
1970-1994 
INE: Gini 
O: Homicide and  
robbery rates 
Dynamic specification 
System GMM estimator 
in order to deal with the 
endogeneity of 
inequality 
Inequality  
increases homicide rates and robbery rates 
Fajnzylber 
et al, 2002b 
Panel data: cross 
country & time 
series  
40 countries  
1970-1994 
INE: Gini, ratio of income 
of the richest to the poorest 
quintile, index of income 
polarization 
O: Homicide and robbery 
rates  
Dynamic specification 
System GMM estimator 
in order to deal with the 
endogeneity of 
inequality 
Crime rates and inequality are positively 
correlated 
Nilsson 2004 Sweden, 
counties, 1973-
2000 
INE: proportion of the 
population with an income 
below 10%, 20% or 40% of 
the median income (PR), 
Gini, 90th/10th percentile 
O: overall crime rate and 3 
property crime-categories: 
burglary, auto theft and 
robbery. 
 
County fixed effects, 
county specific time 
trends 
PR exerts a positive influence on property 
crime but not on assault 
The other inequality measures are not 
related to criminal behaviors 
 
Brush, 2007 USA, counties  
2 periods: 1990 
and 2000 
 
INE: Gini, percent in 
poverty & percent with an 
income over $ 100,000 
O: Overall crime, violent  
and property crimes 
 
Cross-sectional 
estimates based on 2000 
data 
First-differences 
estimates: estimates 
based on within county 
variations 
Cross sectional estimates: positive 
relationship between inequality and 
reported crime rates, both for violent and 
property crimes. 
First difference estimates:  inequality is 
negatively or not significantly associated 
with criminality. 
Choe, 2008 USA, states and 
Columbia 
district, 
1995-2004 
INE: Gini,  
O: Overall violent crime, 
murder, rape, robbery, 
assault, overall property 
crime, burglary, larceny, 
motor 
State fixed or random 
effects estimates 
(decided on the base of 
the Hausman test) 
Arellano Bond estimates 
: dynamic specification 
and  endogeneity of 
covariates taken into 
account  
State fixed or random estimates: overall 
violent and property crimes positively 
influenced by inequality. Among violent 
crime, only rape is associated with 
inequality. For the property crime, burglary 
is related significantly to inequality 
Arellano Bond (GMM)  estimates : 
inequality positively and significantly 
related to robbery and burglary 
Kelly, 2000 
 
Machin and 
Meghir 2004 
USA, urban 
counties,1991 
 
UK, 1975-1996, 
area level 
INE: Gini 
O: Violent and property 
crimes 
 
O: property and vehicle 
crimes 
INE:25
th
  or 10
th
 percentile  
of the real hourly wage 
distribution 
Cross-sectional 
estimates including a set 
of urban specific 
variables 
 
 
Area-fixed effects and 
additional  
covariates  
Inequality is not related to property crime 
but increases violent crime 
The lower is the 25th percentile wage, the 
higher is the probability to observe criminal 
activities 
3.3 Income inequality and health  
 
3.3.1 Rationale 
In the past 20 years more than hundred published articles have been trying to disentangle the relationship between 
income inequality and health (cf. Lynch et al., 2004). This amount of research already indicates that it is far from 
easy to clearly link income inequality to health outcomes. Part of the problem is the lack of a widely accepted 
rationale on why wider income distribution should affect an individual’s health status. A part of the empirical 
evidence even suggests that the causality runs in the other way, i.e. from health to inequality. In the following 
paragraphs, the three most widely mechanisms to connect income inequality and health are discussed (see Leigh et 
al., 2009, Deaton, 2003, and Gravelle, 1998).  
 
The absolute income hypothesis postulates that an individual’s health status increases with individual income but at 
a decreasing rate (see Figure 1). This means that one extra Euro given to a deprived person increases his/her health 
status more than the same Euro spent on a rich person. Hence, there exists a non-linear relationship between income 
and health status. Figure 2 illustrates this argument by displaying at the country level the bivariate relationship 
between life expectancy and GDP per capita.  This non-linear relationship was found between countries when 
comparing richer and poorer countries but also within countries (Leigh et al., 2009, p.6-7). As Deaton (2003) 
argues, this supports the idea that within a country a redistribution of income from richer to poorer individuals will 
increase the overall health status. In other words, under the absolute income hypothesis an effect of income 
inequality on health would be caused by the non-linear relationship of income and health.  
 
 
Figure 1: Non-linear relationship of income and health  
 
Source: Leigh et al., 2009, p. 6 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Cross- country evidence of life expectancy and income 
 
Source: Deaton, 2003, p. 116 
 
The second mechanism proposed in the literature is the relative income hypothesis. The relative income hypothesis 
postulates that an individual’s relative income position within a country affects the individual’s health status. The 
rationale for this hypothesis is not clearly spelled out in the literature. Most scholars, however, propose the 
following mechanism: lower relative income increases chronic stress of individuals, due to an increased feeling of 
deprivation. This chronic stress is then seen to translate into an unhealthier life (Leigh et al., 2009, p.8).  
 
The last mechanism to explain why income inequality might affect health is the idea of societal effects and, in 
particular, the effect of increased violence due to higher income inequality. Higher violence and crime rates might 
lead to higher death rates (i.e. homicides) but also to increased levels of stress, which then translate into worse 
health outcomes. The effect of income inequality on crime was already discussed more extensively in section 3.2. 
Other societal effects mentioned in the literature are related to societal heterogeneity. In particular, greater 
heterogeneity is seen to hinder societies to agree on investments in public goods (cf. Alesina et al., 1999). This 
implies, that higher income inequality might lead to lower investments in the health sector, e.g. in hospitals, and this 
then might translate into lower health status of the surrounding population (cf. Leigh et al., 2009, p. 9-11). 
Moreover, higher income inequality in countries is also related to lower levels of trust (for a discussion, see section 
3.4). 
 
Note, as we already mentioned above, researchers not only propose a causal relationship between income inequality 
and health, but also support the reciprocal relationship, i.e. the effect of increased health status on income. In 
particular, scholars propose that health can affect income via labor market effects, educational effects and marriage 
market effects (Leigh et al., 2009, p.11-13). Leigh et al. (2009) argue that unhealthier individuals have more 
difficulties in finding and retaining a job and in obtaining a promotion, thereby having lower levels of income 
(some evidence on this link can be found in Gertler and Gruber, 2002). Second, improved health of students is 
positively related to educational attainment and to lower dropout rates of students, causing an increased income 
later in life. Last, Leigh et al. (2009) argue that healthier people are more likely to marry and build stable 
relationships, which additionally affects income levels.  
 
In the “empirical evidence” section, we will discuss studies focusing on the impact of the impact of income 
inequality on health and will abstain from discussing evidence on the reverse causality. 
3.3.2 Measures of health and income inequality 
There are two main indicators used to measure health status in the literature. The first relates to an objective 
measurement of health status and uses indicators such as mortality rates and life expectancy. Mortality rates 
measure the death rates in a given year. Life expectancy at birth measures the weighted probability that individuals 
of different ages died in that year. Depending on the sample of countries and type of studies, also other indicators 
are used to investigate the relationship between income inequality and health, including indicators on disabilities, 
death rates according to specific causes (e.g. heart attack), and depressions (for an excellent overview over the 
literature see Lynch, et al., 2004 and Subramanian and Kawachi, 2004). 
 
The second group of indicators used in the literature measures subjective health status using survey data. In various 
surveys, there are questions included on self-rated health status (for example in the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP)). Examples of such questions are “Would you say in general your health is: excellent, 
very good, good, fair, or poor?”. 
 
The main indicator used in the empirical studies is the Gini coefficient, however also other measures of income 
inequality, such as the 90/10 ration, 50/10 ratio, Robin Hood index, Atkinson index, Theil index, median income 
(income of the poorest 50%) are used (cf. Lynch, et al., 2004). 
 
3.3.3 Empirical evidence 
The literature on health and income inequality dates back to the 1970s. More recently, in a series of articles, 
Wilkinson (1992, 1994, 1996) concludes in favor of a negative impact of income inequality on health. However, 
this view was challenged in particular by scholars who pointed to strong inconsistencies in the use of data (Judge, 
1995).
4
 More recent empirical studies provide a mixed picture on the effect of income inequality on health and 
results seem to be sensitive to the (i) underlying regional focus of the study, (ii) estimation methods employed and 
(iii) unit of observation (individuals, state, or country analysis).  
 
Concluding from the wealth of studies reviewed by Lynch et al. (2004), income inequality does not seem to have a 
negative effect on health status at least among wealthier nations, including among them countries such as Belgium, 
Denmark, and Spain (ibid, p.54). In particular, Lynch et al. (2004) argue that there is a positive effect of income 
                                                        
4
 In particular, Judge (1995, p.1283) points out that the econometric results produced by Wilkinson might be explained by the use of an 
incorrect poverty estimate and the use of different years when matching income and life expectancy.  
inequality on mortality rates in Belgium (Lorant et al., 2001), inequality was not related to mortality or heart disease 
in Denmark (Osler et al., 2003), and no effect of inequality on disabilities or life expectancy is found for Spain 
(Regidor et al., 1997). For Sweden, Gerdtham and Johannesson (2004) did not find a significant effect of income 
inequality on mortality. The evidence for the UK is more mixed. Stanistreet et al. (1999) find some significant 
effects of income inequality on health. However, a strong link between inequality and health in the UK is 
challenged by the evidence provided by Weich et al. (2001 and 2002).  
 
Additional evidence is provided by Hildebrand and Van Kerm’s (2009) for 11 European countries. In particular, the 
authors test the relationship by employing data on the NUTS0 and NUTS1 level in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK. Although the authors find a statistically 
significant effect of income inequality on self-rated health status in EU countries, the magnitude of this effect is 
negligible. In contrast, the empirical results for the U.S. point to a consistent and negative effect of income 
inequality on health status (see Lynch et al., 2004). 
 
In conclusion, the empirical evidence suggests that income inequality does not have a negative effect on health 
status at least among wealthier nations in Europe. For the US, on the other hand, there seems to be consistent 
evidence for a negative impact of income inequality on health outcomes.  
  
Table 3: Studies on income inequality and health 
Topic Data Inequality measure 
(INE) 
Main outcome (O) 
Method Results 
Lorant et al. (2001) Belgium, 
municipalities, 
1985-93 
INE: Gini 
O: Mortality and 
morbidity variables 
Weighted least squares 
model and 
simultaneous 
autoregressive model  
Higher income inequality is 
associated with lower 
mortality rates 
Osler et al. (2003) Denmark, 
individuals,  
1964, 1992 
INE: Median share of 
income in municipality 
O: Ischaemic heart 
disease 
Cox’s proportional 
hazard regression 
models 
No clear association 
between income inequality 
and Ischaemic heart disease 
Regidor et al. (1997) Spain, regions,1986 INE: Difference in the 
mean household income 
between those at the 
bottom and those at the 
top of  the income 
hierarchy 
O: Prevalence of long 
term disabilities 
Logistic regressions Income inequality does not 
affect disabilities 
Gerdtham and  
Johannesson (2004) 
Sweden, individuals, 
1980-86 
INE: Gini, Robin Hood 
index, median income, 
variance of income 
O: Survival time in 
years (mortality) 
Cox’s proportional 
hazard regression 
models 
Income inequality does not 
affect mortality rates 
Stanistreeet et al (1999) UK, individuals, 
1991  
INE: squared 
coefficient of variation 
O: Mortality 
OLS Income inequality does 
affect mortality 
Weich et al. (2001) UK, individuals, 
1991 
INE: Gini 
O: Prevalence of mental 
disorder 
Logistic regression, 
with clustered standard 
errors 
Mental disorders were more 
common in areas with 
greater income inequality 
Weich et al. (2002) UK, individuals, 
1991 
INE: Gini 
O: Self-rated health 
Logistic regressions, 
with clustered standard 
errors 
Income inequality is weakly 
related to worse self-rated 
health 
Hildebrand and  
Van Kerm (2009) 
Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, 
France, Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and the UK, 
NUTS0 and NUTS1 
level, 1994-2001 
INE: Gini, Theil index, 
mean log deviation, 
coefficient of variation, 
ratio of 90/10 
O: Self-reported health 
status 
Panel fixed effects 
estimation 
Income inequality is 
negatively related to self-
rated health status but the 
magnitude of the impact of 
inequality on health is low 
 
Leigh and Jencks (2007) Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, 
Ireland; Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, 
UK, US,  1903 - 2003 
INE: Income of richest 
10%  
O: Life expectancy at 
birth and infant 
mortality 
 
Country and year fixed 
effects estimation, 
robust s.e., clustered at 
country level 
 
No relationship between 
mortality and inequality  
 
 
 
 
3.4 Income inequality and social capital  
  
3.4.1 Rationale 
 
The term social capital is often traced back to the work of the sociologist Bourdieu (1977), but it gained popularity 
with the seminal work of Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993). Recently, Guiso et al. (2008) define social capital as 
“good” culture—i.e., a set of beliefs and values that facilitate cooperation among the members. The authors show 
that social capital can be measured by both direct indicators (such as generalized trust) and indirect indicators (such 
as blood donations).  
 
There is a large consensus that heterogeneity is one important factor reducing the formation of social capital. 
Usually, community heterogeneity refers to income inequality but also ethnicity, and racial heterogeneity. In the 
present literature review, we concentrate our attention on economic inequality. Several mechanisms could explain 
the association between economic inequality and social capital. 
 
First, individuals might be adverse to heterogeneity. In other words, they prefer having contacts with individuals 
that are similar to themselves, i.e. that belong to the same socioeconomic group. In heterogeneous societies contacts 
between dissimilar individuals will be at a lower rate than in more homogeneous societies. Repeated interactions 
being conducive of social capital and trust, heterogeneous societies are thus characterized by fewer contacts and, in 
consequence, by lower levels of cooperation and trust (see the seminal work by Colman, 1990, and Alesina et al, 
2002 for instance). 
5
 
This aversion to heterogeneity can be driven by the fact that individuals from different socioeconomic groups are 
less likely to share common values and norms which makes it more difficult for them to predict the attitudes of 
others. This creates an environment not favorable to the development of social capital (Knack and Keefer, 1997).   
 
Second, when resources are not evenly distributed, poor individuals might perceive that they are living in an unfair 
society where the rich tend to exploit the poor. This will lead individuals at the bottom end of the income 
distribution to develop distrust against richer individuals (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2004). Uslaner and Brown (2005) 
argue that when income inequality is high, individuals from different socioeconomic groups will have the sensation 
that they are not sharing the same fate, and this will hamper trust. 
 
Third, inequality should relate to the level of optimism. Higher level of inequality is likely to reduce the level of 
optimism for the future and thereby trust (Uslaner and Brown, 2005, Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005).  
 
                                                        
5 It is also possible that in more heterogeneous societies, contacts with dissimilar individuals are more frequent than in homogeneous 
societies, and because, on average people distrust those that are dissimilar from themselves, then, the level of trust tends to be lower in 
more heterogeneous societies. 
 
Finally, economic inequality increases the incentives for dishonest comportments directed against the rich, by the 
poor people. This implies that poor people will be less trustworthy, which will, thereby, reduce the level of social 
capital of richer individuals. 
  
3.4.2 Measures of social capital and income inequality 
Most of the scholars interested in the relationship between social capital and income inequality have relied on trust 
as a proxy for social capital. The type of question used to assess the level of trust is “In general, do you think that 
most people can be trusted?”. Fewer studies focus on different dimensions of social capital such as group 
membership, volunteering (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2000, Costas and Kahn, 2003, and Uslaner and Brown, 2005), 
informal social capital such as entertaining with friends and relatives (Lancee and Van de Werfhorst, 2011). 
 
The Gini coefficient is by far the most common measure of economic inequality used in the empirical papers though 
other indicators, such as the ratio of the 90th over the 50th or 10th percentile income, interquartile income 
differences (Gustavsson and Jordhal, 2008, Coffe and Geys, 2006) or the mean distance to the median income 
(Lancee and Van de Werfhorst, 2011) have been employed as well. 
 
3.4.3 Empirical evidence 
Empirical studies on the relationship between heterogeneity and the level of social capital are of three types. Cross-
country papers explore either the association at the aggregated level between income inequality and social capital or 
combine individual-level data on social capital with country-level information on economic inequality. Studies on 
single countries pool information on income inequality at the subnational level with individual level information on 
social capital. 
  
Cross-country studies 
Most of the cross-country studies conclude that when income inequality is high, the level of social capital tends to 
be lower (Knack and Keefer, 1997, Uslaner, 2002, Leigh, 2006a, Fisher and Torgler, 2006, Berggren and Jordhal, 
2007, Bjornskov, 2006).   
  
Based on aggregated country-level data drawn from the World Values Surveys, cross-country estimates reported in 
Knack and Keefer (1997) show that the country level of income inequality is negatively and significantly related to 
trust and civic cooperation. The empirical analysis is based on 29 market countries, and several country-level 
controls are included in the estimates. 
  
Contrary to the studies mentioned above, Leigh (2006a) explores the relationship between social capital and income 
inequality but combines individual data drawn from the World Values Surveys in 59 countries with country 
measure of income dispersion. The author finds that both income inequality and ethnic heterogeneity are negatively 
associated with trust but that the effect of income inequality dominates the one of ethnic heterogeneity. The results 
hold even after taking into account the reciprocal relationship between income inequality and social capital. Using 
also the World Value Surveys, cross-country estimates in Berggren and Jordhal (2006) confirm these findings. 
Fisher and Torgler (2006) also with individual data on trust for 25 countries observe that trust is positively 
associated with a person's relative income position as measured by the difference between a respondent’s income 
and the national (or regional) income. 
  
While all the papers mentioned above find a strong negative association between social capital and economic 
inequality, Steijn and Lancee (2011), on contrary, conclude that income inequality and perceived inequality do not 
correlate with trust once country wealth is controlled for.  Additionally, Lancee and Van de Werfhorst (2011) 
examine the effect of income inequality in EU countries on various forms of social capital capturing social, civic 
and cultural participation. The empirical work is based on the 2006 EU-SILC survey and demonstrates, that while, 
on the one hand, civic participation is significantly associated with economic inequality, on the other hand, this does 
not seem to be the case for social and cultural participation. 
  
Although these studies are all informative, they are problematic when it comes to making causal statements. Indeed, 
cross-country analyses are plagued by the risk of omitting relevant variables, and comparability issues between 
countries (particularly to measure income inequality) which would bias the results and would lead to misleading 
conclusions. In particular, this body of literature is mainly based on static data (one point per country) meaning that 
it is not possible to control for all potential time-invariant country specific-effects (and thus to look at the effect, 
within a country, of income inequality change on social capital formation). 
  
Single-country studies 
Research based on a single country generally relies on a multilevel approach. Social capital is measured at the 
individual level and explained by both individual socioeconomic characteristics (age, educational attainment, 
income, gender, etc) and the social context in which the respondents are living (in particular, the level of 
community heterogeneity). This social context is defined at the municipal/neighborhood level (Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2000, 2002, Leigh, 2006a, Costas and Kahn, 2003, Coffe and Geys, 2006, Gustavsson and Jordhal, 2008). 
The fact of relating individual-level data on trust with income inequality measures from local communities presents 
the main advantage of keeping constant country-specific determinants of trust which are susceptible to bias cross-
country estimates if they are not controlled for. Furthermore, while income inequality measures used for cross-
comparisons are subject to measurement comparability issues, this is less the case when one relies on income 
inequality measures of different geographical units within a given country. 
  
A significant literature has documented the negative effect of community heterogeneity on social capital across 
metropolitan areas in the US. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000 and 2002) use cross-sectional data from the US General 
Social Surveys over the period 1974-1994 to examine the effect of community heterogeneity on membership and 
trust. After having controlled for individual and some community characteristic as well as for year and state-fixed 
effects, the authors find that respondents living in more racially fragmented and income unequal communities report 
lower levels of social capital. However, the effect of racial heterogeneity is even stronger and income inequality has 
no longer a significant effect on trust when this variable is added to the empirical model. Costas and Kahn (2003) 
also observe a negative impact of community heterogeneity on various measures of social capital (volunteering and 
membership in organizations), once they control for individual characteristics as well as for time and regional 
dummies. However, in constrast to Alesina and La Ferrara (2000 and 2002) their results suggest that the crucial 
determinant of volunteering and membership in organizations is income inequality.
6,7
  Tesei (2011), using the 
decomposability of the Theil index, shows that what really matters is income inequality between racial groups. 
While racial fragmentation and economic inequality are both significantly associated with trust and group 
participation, these effects become insignificant when income inequality between racial groups is accounted for. 
 
Solid empirical evidence on the relationship between social capital and income inequality outside the US are quite 
limited. Leigh (2006b) analyzes the determinants of localized trust (trusting those living in the same neighborhoods) 
and generalized trust (trusting those who live in the same country) in Australia using individual data over the period 
1997-1998 combined with information on the neighborhood in which the respondents are living. Results suggest 
that there is not an apparent relationship between inequality and trust and this result remain identical when the 
author accounts for the possible “endogeneity” of income inequality. 
 
Coffe and Geys (2006) explore the effect of income inequality on the municipality level of social capital in 307 
Flemish municipalities in 2000. The authors rely on 3 indicators measuring social capital in a broad sense: 
associational life, electoral participation and crime rate that are combined into a single index using a principal 
component analysis. After having controlled for several socioeconomic characteristics of the municipality, the 
authors do not observe any effect of income inequality on social capital. On contrary, ethnic heterogeneity has a 
depressing effect on social capital. 
 
Gustavsson and Jordhal (2008) combine Swedish individual-level panel data (1994-1998) on trust with county level 
measures of inequality. The results suggest that different measures of income inequality lead to different 
conclusions. The Gini coefficient is weakly related to trust while the ratio of the 50th over the 10th percentile income 
displays a negative and significant association with trust suggesting that differences in the bottom half in the income 
distribution are those that matter the most for explaining trust. Compared to Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2002), 
Leigh (2006b) or Costas and Kahn (2003), the panel data employed in this study allows for controlling for time-
invariant individual and county characteristics in addition to the conventional time-varying individual covariates. 
This implies that the estimated association between social capital and income inequality is very likely to be a causal 
one. 
                                                        
6 Costas and Kahn (2003) also find that the increase in the participation of women on the labour market is the main responsible for the 
decline in social capital produced inside home (entertaining friends and relatives). 
7 Note that when the authors correct for the endogeneity of income inequality in the volunteering equation, the coefficients associated with 
income inequality becomes insignificant. 
 
 In conclusion, macro studies usually conclude that income inequality depresses social capital while micro studies 
produce more contrasted results. In the USA, there seems to be a robust negative association between community 
heterogeneity and social capital. Findings for other countries are less conclusive.  
  
Table 4: Studies on income inequality and social capital 
Topic Data Inequality measure (INE) 
Main outcome (O) 
Method Results 
Alesina and 
La Ferrara 
(2002) 
USA 
1974-1994 
 
INE : Gini measured at the local 
level (metropolitan areas) 
O: Trust 
 
Control for individual and 
communities character plus 
state and year dummies 
 
DFbeta method to control for 
outliers 
 
 
Respondents living in more 
fragmented and income unequal 
communities report lower level of 
trust 
Effect of income inequality no 
longer significant when racial 
heterogeneity is controlled for 
Alesina and 
La Ferrara, 
(2000) 
USA 
1974-1994 
 
 
INE: Gini measured at the local 
level (metropolitan areas) 
O: Membership rate 
Inclusion of  individual and 
community covariates plus 
state and time dummies 
DFbetas method 
IV estimates 
People living in more unequal 
communities are less likely to join 
groups, even after controlling for 
racial fragmentation 
Knack and 
Keefer 
(1997) 
Cross-country 
1981and 
1990/1991 
29 market 
economies  
INE :Gini coefficient 
O: Trust and civic cooperation 
Cross country estimates (one 
point in time), including 
country covariates 
 
Trust and civic norms are stronger 
in nations with higher and more 
equal incomes 
Gustavsson 
and Jordahl 
(2008) 
Sweden, 1994-
1998 
 
 
INE : Gini, 90/10, 90/50, 50/10 
ratios 
O: Trust 
Individual data in panel 
combined with county specific 
information  
 
Controls include county and 
individual fixed effects, time 
dummies and time-varying 
individual covariates 
OLS and IV estimates 
 
Gini coefficient weakly related to 
trust while the ratio p50-10 is 
negatively and significantly related 
to trust.  
Differences in the bottom half in the 
income distribution matter for trust. 
The effect of income inequality is 
primarily observed for people with 
a strong aversion against income 
inequality 
Leigh, (2006 
a) 
Cross-country: 
59 countries 
 (1999/2000 
and 1995/1997) 
INE :Gini  
O: Trust 
OLS Estimates at the (i) 
country level and (ii) 
individual level 
IV estimates with inequality 
instrumented by the relative 
size of a country’s mature 
age cohort 
Country income inequality is 
negatively and significantly 
associated with country level of 
trust 
Leigh, (2006 
b) 
Australia, 
1997-1998 
INE: Gini  
O:“generalized” and “localized” 
trust 
Probit and IV estimates on 
individual data with income 
inequality measured at the 
neighbourhood-level and 
individual controls 
Income inequality at the 
neighborhood level is not 
significantly associated with 
individual trust. It is racial 
fragmentation that matters. 
Coffe and 
Geys, 2006 
Belgium, 2000 INE: Ratio of the interquartile 
difference in income (Q3-Q1) to 
the median income level  
O: (i) Electoral turnout in 2000 
at municipal elections, (ii) 
density of associational activity, 
(iii) crime rate per capita. The 3 
SC indicators are combined 
together. 
Cross -sectional (307 
municipalities) 
OSL and interval estimates  
Several control for the 
socioeconomic 
characteristics of the 
municipality 
Explanatory variables lagged 
one year 
Income inequality is not 
significantly correlated with the 
municipality’s level of social 
capital. 
Costa and 
Kahn (2003) 
USA, period 
coverage 
varying 
(between 1972 
and 1998) 
INE: Gini (measured at the 
municipal level) 
 
O: Social capital produced 
outside home: trust, 
volunteering, membership, 
social capital produced inside 
Probit estimates 
Controls include individual 
character, survey and 
regional dummies, in 
addition to the variables 
measuring community 
heterogeneity. 
Rising community heterogeneity, 
and in particular income inequality, 
is negatively and significantly 
related to social capital 
home: entertaining, meeting 
friends 
 
 
 
IV estimates also presented 
for the determinants of 
volunteering 
Berggren 
and Jordhal 
(2006) 
Cross-country 
24 countries 
1995 or 2000  
INE: Gini 
O:Trust 
Cross -country estimates 
Include country-level 
covariates 
Rising income inequality is 
associated with lower trust  
Fischer and 
Torgler 
(2006) 
Cross-country 
25 countries 
1998 
INE: Relative income position 
O: Generalized trust and trust in 
institutions 
Cross country estimates 
based on individual data 
Probit estimates 
Estimates include individual 
controls 
Trust rises with the respondent’s 
relative income position 
Steijn  and 
Lancee 
(2011) 
Cross-country 
20 Western 
countries, 1999 
21 European 
countries, 2002 
INE: Conventional gini 
coefficient and Gini coefficient 
of perceived inequality 
O: Trust 
Cross-country estimates, at 
one point in time 
Individual controls  
Multilevel logistic and linear 
models 
Once we control for general wealth, 
the effects of  actual inequality and 
perceived inequality are not 
significantly different from the zero 
 
Uslaner and 
Brown 
(2005) 
USA INE: Gini 
O: Trust, civic and political 
participation  
Cross-sectional estimates; 
state controls, time fixed 
effect 
States with higher levels of 
economic inequality have fewer 
trusters. None of the measures of 
political participation are 
significantly related to trust. 
Tesei (2011) USA, 
1972-2008 
INE: Gini index, Theil index 
O :Trust, group membership 
Individual data combined 
with community measures of 
community heterogeneity 
Both racial fragmentation and 
income inequality are negatively 
correlated with trust.  Racial 
fragmentation has the strongest 
effect. 
The opposite is found for group 
membership: income inequality has 
the strongest effect 
When income inequality between 
racial groups is accounted for, 
income inequality and racial 
fragmentation become insignificant. 
Bjornskov 
(2006) 
Cross-country, 
88 countries 
 
INE: Gini 
O: Trust 
Static cross-country 
estimates 
The strongest determinant of trust is 
fractionalization and in particular 
income inequality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Income inequality and education 
 
3.5.1 Rationale  
The high and positive correlation between education and income is a well-established fact. In the theory of the 
human capital, Gary Becker (1964) showed that acquiring education increases the skills and competencies of 
individuals and their productivity. Since in a competitive labor market wages equal workers’ productivity, higher 
productivity leads to higher wage. This means that a more educated society holds greater welfare. Since its 
conceptualization, this theory was the focus of increasing scientific research. Supporting as well as opposing views 
have encouraged the production of countless empirical and theoretical studies. Nowadays, the acknowledgment of a 
causal relationship between education and earning is a well-established result and it is one of the most important 
achievements in economics.  
 
Conversely things are less clear-cut when analyzing the link between income inequality and educational 
attainments.  
 
On the one hand, rising wage inequality should encourage investments in education mainly because it raises the 
return to education. Topel (1997) observes a faster skill accumulation as a result of rising returns. This increase in 
the supply of skills should eventually mitigate the increase in inequality. 
 
On the other hand, increasing income inequality affects also the resources that households have available to finance 
education. The intergenerational theory claims that there exists a perfect correlation between income and education 
distributions. This entails that barriers, e.g. liquidity constraints, family background, might prevent the investment 
in education for the fraction of the population belonging to the bottom of the income distribution. If the 
intergenerational mechanism is persistent then the same part of population are trapped at low levels of education 
and income for more than one generation. 
 
3.5.2 Measures of education and income inequality 
The main measure of educational attainment used in the literature is the highest degree of education an individual 
has completed. Education can be recorded as years of completed education or as an ordinal variable with the 
obvious ordering going from the lowest to the highest level of education. An alternative measure used by several 
empirical studies is also the enrollment rate for the three educational levels (primary, secondary, and tertiary 
education). 
 
Regarding the macro studies, income inequality is measured by the Gini index as well as the income quartiles, while 
the micro studies have used the family income as a determinant of educational choices. 
 
3.5.3 Empirical evidence 
Papers analyzing the effect of income (wealth) inequality on educational attainments can be divided in two broad 
groups: the first one related to the macroeconomic literature analyzes the more general relationship between 
inequality and growth, and considers education as a key factor to increase growth. The second group of studies 
focuses on the effect of family income on children’s outcomes and applies a microeconomic approach. However, 
both groups attempt to provide evidence and/or theoretically support for the idea that unequal society might harm 
investments in education. 
 
Amongst others, the papers by Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Perotti (1993) pertain to 
the macroeconomic approach. In particular, Galor and Zeira (1993) show that ,in the presence of imperfect credit 
markets, the wealth distribution affects investments in human capital. By developing an overlapping generation 
model with intergenerational transmissions they suggest that the initial distribution of wealth is crucial to determine 
individuals’ educational choices and the aggregate output both in the short and in the long run. Along the same line 
of reasoning, Banerjee and Newman (1993) end up with similar conclusions. Their theoretical model suggests that 
the pattern of occupational (educational) choice is shaped by the initial distribution of wealth. 
 
Perotti (1993) investigates the relationship between income distribution, democratic institution and growth. The 
paper mainly aimed at addressing data and estimation issues. One of Perotti’s main conclusions is that there is 
strong empirical support for the link going from income distribution to education decisions, i.e. more equal societies 
have higher rates of investment in education. 
 
In addition, Filmer and Pritchett (1999) perform an empirical analysis using household surveys for 35 countries. 
They demonstrate that the poverty index, their proxy for economic status of the household, is correlated with 
reduced school attainment in the poorest 40 percent of the population. This finding is confirmed by Flug et al. 
(1998). Flug’s empirical investigation is based on macro panel data and suggests that credit market imperfections as 
well as more unequal income distribution negatively affect secondary school enrollments. 
 
Checchi (2003) investigats the issue using an unbalanced panel of 108 countries for the period 1960-95. His main 
finding is a robust negative correlation between income inequality and secondary education enrolment. The effect is 
stronger when considering female’s access to any level of education. These results support the view that poor 
families are prevented from accessing school by their low incomes. Thus, greater income inequality reduces access 
to school. 
 
Except for the theoretical papers by Galor and Zeira (1993), and Banerjee and Newman (1993), the empirical 
macro-studies lack in properly addressing the endogeneity of the inequality variable, that is, when other omitted 
factors are correlated with both the education and inequality measure, or when the causation goes to the other way 
around (education causes inequality). Thus, caution is needed when interpreting these results. 
  
The second group of studies is concerned with the effect of family income on children’ educational outcomes. The 
idea underlying this line of research is that rich parents can spend more – or have unconstrained access to credit - 
than poor parents on their children’s education and that these investments lead to better outcomes for their children. 
Although intuitive, the hypothesis has not found clear evidence in the literature: findings range from moderate to no 
effect of parental income on children educational attainment. It is worth mentioning that this class of studies has 
dealt carefully with the endogeneity of the income variable in the education equation. The income variable is 
endogenous since other factors, such as parents’ schooling and parents’ ability, might determine both family income 
and children’s outcomes. As a consequence, these studies provide more reliable results than the macro-studies. 
 
Ellwood and Kane (2000) focuson the effect of family background on college enrollment in United States. They 
find that enrollment rates have risen at the top income quartile of the parents, even though the positive effect is also 
explained by difference in average parental education. However, the authors did not find any effect when 
controlling for high school achievements. Hence, they conclude that lot of the variation in attending college is 
probably captured by student own ability. 
 
Conversely, Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) identify the effect of family income by exploiting change in the U.S. 
distribution of wages over the period 1970-1990. Their findings suggest that, on average, an increase in family 
income is associated with a higher probability of enrolling in college. On the other hand, when they estimate 
separate effects for family income and educational enrolment according to income quartiles, they did not find 
support for any differential effect for poor and rich families. 
 
Akee et al. (2010) used a permanent exogenous increase in a household’s income due to a government transfer to 
test if larger family income affects children’s education and criminal behavior. Their results indicat that changes in 
a household’s permanent income tend to improve the overall child outcomes in terms of educational attainment at 
ages 19 and 21 and reduced criminal behavior at ages 16 and 17. 
 
Using father’s trade union membership and father’s occupational status as instruments for income, Shea (2000) 
claims that income has no effect on child outcomes while Chevalier et al. (2005) find that permanent income 
matters in children’s educational attainment. Loken (2007) uses the Norwegian oil boom of the 1970s and 1980s, 
which only affected a few regions of the country, as an instrument for increases in household income that is 
unrelated to parental characteristics. She finds that there is no effect of parents’ income on child educational 
attainment. 
 
Cameron and Heckman (2001) employed a different approach. They estimated a dynamic model of schooling 
attainment to investigate the sources of racial and ethnic disparity in college attendance. Their findings suggest that 
family income matters, but it has its greatest influence on forming the ability and college readiness of children and 
not in financing college education. Also, family income may be more important for educational transitions at 
younger ages. 
 Carneiro and Heckman (1998) critically examine the two common interpretations of the empirical evidence 
showing differences in college participation rates across income groups: (i) short-run credit constraints and (ii) 
long-term factors promoting the cognitive and non-cognitive child’s ability, like family background, parental 
resources in a child’s formative years. They show that, after controlling for student’s test scores (student’s proxy for 
innate ability), parental income has little effect on college enrollment. There is also little evidence that credit 
constraints explain much of the gap in college participation. 
 
Finally, Cameron and Taber (2004) analyzed the importance of borrowing constraints on education decisions by 
using four different strategies: schooling attainment models, instrumental variable wage regressions, and two 
structural economic models that integrate both schooling choices and schooling returns. None of the methods 
produces evidence that borrowing constraints generate inefficiencies in the market for schooling. 
 
The literature, reviewed in this section, has provided contrasting results on the relationship between income 
inequality and educational attainments. According to the more robust micro-studies, the findings range from 
moderate to no effect of income on educational attainment. However, when interpreting these results, one has to 
bring to mind that the causal direction can go both ways, the inequality affects the education but also the education 
might influence the inequality. Disentangling the effect of income inequality on education, it is not an easy task and 
requires a very robust econometric strategy. Yet, these results might depend strongly on the strategy adopted by the 
researchers. As such, the aforementioned conclusions should be taken with caution.  
 
  
Table 5: Studies on income inequality and education 
Topic Data Inequality measure 
(INE) 
Main outcome (O) 
Method Results 
Galor and 
Zeira 
(1993) 
Theoretical model Individuals ‘income 
O: Educational choices 
and aggregate output 
Overlapping generations model 
with intergenerational 
transmissions and imperfect 
credit markets 
Individuals who inherit a large 
enough wealth are able to invest 
more in human capital; credit market 
imperfection carry out this inequality 
also  in the long run 
Banerjee 
and 
Newman 
(1993) 
Theoretical model Individuals’ income 
O: Occupational and 
educational choices 
Static and dynamic partial 
equilibrium model with credit 
market imperfection 
Initial distribution of wealth strongly 
shapes the occupational distribution 
Perotti 
(1993) 
67 countries, 1960-
85 
INE: Quintile shares in 
income 
O: School enrolment ratio 
Reduced-form linear regression More equal society have higher rates 
of investment in education 
Filmer and 
Pritchett 
(1999) 
35 countries INE: Poverty index 
calculated as principal 
component of ownership 
of various assets (e.g., 
radio, television, 
refrigerator) and housing 
characteristics 
O: completed educational 
grade for the cohort 15-19 
Descriptive analysis Children from the poorest family 
show reduced school attainment 
Flug et al. 
(1998) 
122 countries,  
1970-1990 
 Per capita income 
O: Average over 1970-
1992 of secondary school 
enrollment 
Reduced-form linear regression 
Panel fixed-effects regression 
Income inequality together with 
credit constraints affect negatively 
secondary school enrollment 
Checchi 
(2003) 
108 countries, 
1960–95 
INE: Gini index 
O: Primary, secondary and 
tertiary enrollment rate 
Panel fixed-effects regression Negative correlation between income 
inequality and secondary enrollment; 
stronger effect for primary and 
tertiary  education enrollment for 
women 
Ellwood 
and Kane 
(2000) 
High School and 
Beyond (HSB), 
National Education 
Longitudinal Study 
(NELS) 1988 
INE: Family income 
quartiles 
O: College enrollment 
Reduced-form linear regression 10% greater chance for enrollment in 
4-year college moving from 1st to 
2nd quartile; 4% greater chance of 
enrolling in any post-secondary 
schooling. No effect when 
controlling for high school 
achievements 
Acemoglu 
and 
Pischke 
(2001) 
USA, 1972, 1988 - Family income 
O: College enrollment 
Instrumental variable regression 
exploiting change in the U.S. 
distribution of wages over the 
period 1970-1990 
A 10% increase in family income 
predicts a 1.1% rise in chance of 
enrolling in college.  Effects not 
bigger for poor and possibly bigger 
for families in the richest quartile 
Akee et al. 
(2010) 
USA Family income 
O: Educational attainment 
at age 19 and 21; High 
school graduation 
Natural experiment: comparing 
children in Native American 
families who benefited from 
Casino (opened on the Eastern 
Cherokee reservation) profits to 
non-Native families that did not 
benefit 
Families receiving additional income 
tend to improve the overall child 
outcomes in terms of educational 
attainment at ages 19 and 21 and 
reduced criminal behavior at ages 16 
and 17 
Shea 
(2000) 
USA Fathers’ labor earnings 
and parents’ total income 
(labor, asset and transfer 
income) 
Instrumental variable regression 
using fathers’ union, industry 
and job loss variables as 
instruments for parents’ income 
Parents' money is not directly 
relevant to children's educational 
attainment 
O: Years of schooling 
Chevalier 
et al. 
(2005) 
UK, 1993-2003 - Parental income 
O: Early school leaving 
and achievement at age 
16, measured as the 
number of General 
Certificate of Secondary 
Education qualifications 
obtained at the passing 
grades of A to C 
Instrumental variable regression 
using union status of the father as 
instrument for parental income 
Permanent income and credit 
constraints at age 16 significantly 
affect children’s educational 
outcomes 
Loken 
(2007) 
Norway, 1960, 
1970 and 1980 
Family income 
O: Years of education 
Natural experiment: Norwegian 
oil shock in the 1970s affecting 
some regions is used as an 
instrument for family income 
No effect of parents’ income on child 
educational attainment 
Cameron 
and 
Heckman 
(1998) 
USA, 1979 Family income 
O: College enrollment 
Dynamic discrete choice model 
of schooling decisions from age 
15–24 
Weakly relation between income and 
college enrollment;  greatest 
influence of income on forming the 
ability and college readiness of 
children 
Carneiro 
and 
Heckman 
(2002) 
USA, 1979 Non-parametric nonlinear 
measures of parental 
income (quartiles) 
measured in adolescence 
O: College enrollment 
Linear and instrumental variable 
regressions 
Parental income has little effect on 
college enrollment; higher effect for 
the upper quartiles 
Cameron 
and Taber 
(2004) 
USA, 1979 Family earnings 
O: Years of schooling 
Schooling attainment models; 
instrumental variable wage 
regressions; structural economic 
models 
Effects are not statistically significant 
 
  
3.6 Income inequality and voting behavior  
 
3.6.1 Rationale 
According to the class-bias hypothesis, economic inequality should lower the political participation of the poorer 
citizens. The idea is that concentrations of wealth and power are related to each other. Rich individuals will have 
more power than the poorer ones on the political scene, preventing debates about issues that are important for the 
poor fringe of the population. As the opinion of the low-income group is are not taken into account for designing 
policies, the expected benefits from voting are lower for this group than for the high-income group leading the 
former to opt out of civic engagement (see Horn, 2011). The implication of the class bias hypothesis is that voter 
turnout and economic inequality should be negatively related to each other (Solt, 2010, and Mueller and Stratmann, 
2003).  
 
Under the assumption that (i) government policies are directly responsive to the preferences of the citizens 
expressed in elections and (ii) government policies affect the distribution of income, through taxation and transfers, 
a reduced engagement of the low-income group means that elected political leaders will put into place policies that 
will only reflect the preferences of high-income groups. As put by Lijphart (1997, p.1) and reported in Mueller and 
Stratmann (2003) low participation in elections will lead to “inequality of representation and influence [that] are not 
randomly distributed but systematically biased in favor of more privileged citizens – those with higher income, 
greater wealth and better education and against the less advantaged citizen”. This argument fits with the median 
voter hypothesis (see Meltzer and Richard, 1981). If turnout is skewed by income, the income of the median voter 
will be higher than the mean income of the country, and this will lead to a lower demand for taxes and transfers 
which will induce an increase of inequality (see Milanovic, 2000, Malher, 2008 for empirical tests of median voter 
hypothesis).
8
 
 
The relationship between turnout and inequality is thus likely to be mutually reinforcing. A low political 
participation leads to economic inequality if this participation is lower among the low-income groups than for the 
rest of the population. In turn, rising economic inequality risks discouraging participation among low-income 
groups, and so on. 
 
The conflict theory, on the other hand, predicts the opposite. Rising income inequality should result in more 
political engagement. Indeed, greater level of inequality causes disagreements in political preferences that spurs 
discussions about the suitable policies. These discussions are then seen to cause higher rates of political 
mobilizations and to stimulate more interest and participation in the political interest. As explained in Horn (2011), 
                                                        
8 Horn (2011) argues that the effect of increasing inequality on turnout might depend on whether this increase is driven by the growth of 
top income or, on contrary, by a relative deterioration of the situation of the low-income group. In the first case, low and medium income 
group could unite together to promote redistributive policies that favor the medium income group and which are more favorable for the 
low-income group than policies that would be designed for the most advantaged groups. Under such circumstances, the low-income group 
might have an additional incentive to vote. The opposite will happen if rising income inequality is due to a decrease of the income of the 
low-income group relatively to the rest of the population. 
under the premise of the rational voter hypothesis, if inequality is low, both low and high-income groups might have 
a low incentive to vote if one consider that redistributive policies are the main issues decided by governments as 
none of the two groups has a lot to lose. The opposite will be observed if inequality is high. Anecdotal evidence for 
this theory might be the recent protests ‘Occupy Wallstreet’.  
 
3.6.2 Income and voting behavior measures 
The main indicator used in the empirical studies is the Gini coefficient, though measures of income inequality have 
been used as well, such as the 80/20 ratio or the mean distance to the median income (Horn, 2011, Mahler, 2002). 
Measures of voting behavior are mainly indicators of electoral participation or political preferences.  
 
3.6.3 Empirical evidence 
As explained above the relationship between civic engagement and economic inequality is likely to be circular. In 
this literature review, we only present the papers examining whether and how inequality affects voting behavior. In 
other words, we do not discuss the studies assuming that the direction of causation goes from electoral turnout to 
income inequality.
9
   
 
Because of this reciprocal relationship and of the various variables that are likely to simultaneously influence 
political participation and income inequality (individual, political and institutional factors), the findings presented 
below must be interpreted cautiously.
10
 
11
 Most of the studies discussed below do not control for all potential 
confounding factors as well as for the reciprocal relationship. 
 
Cross-country studies 
The main cross-country studies are those of Horn (2011) and Lancee and Van Werfhorst (2011), Solt (2008) and 
Malher (2002).   
 
Using the 2009 European Election Study, Horn (2011) explores whether economic inequality impacts on 
participation in elections in EU countries. Estimates are based on one point in time and include country (size of the 
population, electoral system, compulsory voting, etc.) and individual (age, age squared, gender) controls. The 
author relies on various income inequality measures (Gini, s80/20, p95/p5, and distance from the median) in order 
to explore the effect of rising inequalities in different parts of the distribution. Results are mixed, with the effect of 
inequality varying according to the inequality indicators chosen. However, in most of the cases, inequality is not 
significantly related to voting behavior.  
                                                        
9 See, for instance, Mueller and Stratmann (2003). 
10
 See Geys (2006a) for a comprehensive literature review about the factors explaining turnout. 
11 Lister (2007) argues that the negative association between economic inequality and civic engagement is due to cross-country differences 
in social norms. According to the authors, the institutions (such as Universalist welfare states) shape social norms and individual voting 
behavior. 
 
 Lancee and Van Werfhorst (2011), also on a sample of EU countries and using the 2006 survey of the EU-SILC 
survey, test the effect of inequality on civic, social and cultural participation. Their indicator of civic participation 
measures participation in various activities, including political parties, political associations and trade union. Their 
findings suggest that, conditional on observable individual characteristics and a limited number of country controls, 
civic participation is negatively and significantly associated with economic inequality.  
 
Solt (2008) examines the effect of economic inequality on political interest and voting participation of citizens using 
individual-level data for 23 advanced industrial countries. Indicators of political engagement are drawn from 
various surveys (Eurobarameter, International Social Survey Program, European Election Survey, Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems) and cover a period spanning from 1984 to 2000. Results again point to the detrimental 
effect of inequality on political engagement after having controlled for a certain number of individual and country 
controls.
12
  
 
Mahler (2002) explores the relationship between electoral turnout and income inequality using measures of income 
distribution and voting participation at the sub-national level for a set of 12 developed countries and conclude that 
inequality reduces voter turnout. In comparison to Horn (2011), Lancee and Van Werfhorst (2011) and Solt (2008), 
in this paper, the authors can account for all observable and unobservable national-level time invariant effects (such 
as the institutions). Furthermore, the author made an attempt to account for the reciprocal relationship between 
electoral turnout and economic inequality.  
 
Single-country studies 
Galbraith and Hale (2008) examine in the USA the association between income inequality, turnout and party 
preferences after having accounting for other factors that might mitigate the inequality effect. The analysis is carried 
out at the state level over a 24 years period when the dependent variable is the turnout rate and over a 12 years 
period when the dependent variable measures the share of individuals having voted for a democratic party. The 
estimates, including state fixed-effects, show that income inequality is significantly associated with lower voter 
turnout and a stronger democratic vote. The authors also argue that more than raw inequality, it is the level of 
segregation which matters: state with higher levels of spatial-economic segregation show markedly lower self-
reported turnout.  
 
Solt (2010), using American election data and the Gini coefficient for 3 years (1980, 1990 and 2000) show that 
income inequality associates negatively with electoral participation, while richer people tend to vote relatively more 
as inequality rises, confirming the class-bias hypothesis. 
 
                                                        
12 Note that though for most of the countries the author observes inequality for at least 2 different periods of time, they do not include 
country-fixed effects in their estimates.  
Leigh (2005) explores with an Australian dataset the relationship between party preference and a set of individuals 
and neighborhood-level factors. OLS (or probit) estimates suggest that the level of income inequality in the 
neighborhood is not significantly associated with specific party preferences while the rich neighborhood are 
characterized by a higher probability to vote for the conservative party. However, when the author accounts for the 
potential endogeneity of the neighbor effect (i.e. where individuals choose to live is often related their policy 
preferences) the probability to vote for the labor party increases with higher neighborhood inequality.
13
 
 
Yamamura (2009) uses panel data at the prefecture level in Japan and finds that voter turnout is significantly 
associated with economic inequality and age based heterogeneity. This result holds even after including prefecture-
level fixed effects. 
 
In conclusion, most of the cross-country studies, based on a set of EU or advanced countries, conclude in favor of a 
negative effect of income inequality on voter turnout.  Empirical analyses based on a single country tend to come to 
the same conclusion. We note, however, that none of these country-specific studies is based on European countries.   
  
                                                        
13 Following Dustmann and Preston (2001), Leigh (2005) instruments neighborhood-related variables by equivalent variables at a higher 
level of aggregation (region). The idea is that individuals decide where to live at the local level but are more constrained at the regional 
level (employment situation, family-related issues). 
 
Table 6: Studies on income inequality and voting participation 
Topic Data Inequality measure (INE) 
Main outcome (O) 
Method Results 
Galbraith 
and Hale 
(2008) 
USA, 1969-2004 
 
INE Gini 
O: Political 
engagement(democratic share), 
voter turnout 
Cross states estimates, 
year 2000 
Cross states estimates 
with state fixed effects 
(1964-2004) 
Estimates include state-
level controls 
Income inequality at the state level is 
associated with a lower voter turnout 
and a stronger democratic vote 
Solt (2008) Cross-country 
23 advanced 
industrial 
countries 
1984-2000 (time 
coverage varies 
with countries) 
INE: Gini  
O: Political engagement: political 
interest, political discussion and 
electoral participation 
 
Estimates at the 
individual level 
including individual and 
country controls 
Logit 
Country’s income inequality reduces 
individual political engagement 
The effect increases with relative 
declining income 
Horn (2011) EU countries, 
2009 
INE: Gini, s80/s20, poverty rate, 
p95/p5, mean distance from the 
median 
O: Voter turnout 
Logit, model, 2 step 
model and hierarchical 
model 
Include individual 
controls and country 
level controls 
The effect of inequality on voter 
turnout depends on the selected 
inequality indicators.  In most of the 
cases, the coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero 
Lancee and 
Van 
Werfhorst 
(2011) 
EU countries, 
2006 
INE: Mean distance to the 
median income (below and above 
the median separately) 
O: Social, civic and cultural 
participation 
Include individual 
covariates 
and country measures of 
income dispersion 
Civic participation is significantly 
associated with economic inequality, 
on the other hand, this does not seem 
to be the case for social and cultural 
participation. 
  
 
Malher 
(2002) 
12 developed 
countries, 
late 1980s/early 
1990s, mid-
1990s, 
 
INE: Intra-regional inequality: 
ratio of the income at the 90th 
percentile to that of one at the 
10th percentile, Gini, ratio of the 
median income of a given region 
to the median income of the 
region 
Analysis done at the 
regional level 
 
3SLS, allows for 
reciprocal relationship 
 
Number of sub-national 
controls 
Results suggest that inequality 
reduces turnout and also that turnout 
impact on inequality 
 
Yamamura 
(2009) 
Japan, 1989-
2003 
prefecture-level 
panel data 
INE: Gini  
O: Voting behaviour 
Prefecture fixed effects  
Prefecture-level 
covariates 
Voting behavior is influenced by 
income inequality and age-based 
heterogeneity 
Leigh (2005) Australia 
1966-2001 
INE: Gini 
O: Labour versus conservative 
parties 
Probit 
2SLS estimates 
Living in an unequal neighborhood 
increases the chance to vote for a left-
wing party (2sls estimates) 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7 Income inequality and female labor participation 
3.7.1 Rationale 
This paragraph deals with the question whether income inequality does affect labor market participation of women. 
However, screening the literature, it becomes clear that the relationship between inequality and female labor 
participation is mainly seen in the light of the effect of women’s earnings on family income and on overall income 
inequality. To our knowledge, there is neither theoretical nor empirical evidence on how income inequality might 
affect the participation rate of women in the labor force. Hence, the causality is seen to run from increased labor 
participation of women to income inequality and not the other way around. Therefore, in the following paragraphs 
we briefly summarize the literature and evidence available of the contribution of female labor market participation 
on reducing income inequality. 
 
3.7.2 Empirical evidence  
There are quite numerous studies investigating to which extent the increased participation of women in the labor 
market has an influence on income inequality (Esping-Andersen, 2005, Burtless, 1999, Harkness et al., 1997, 
Karoly and Burtless, 1995, Douglas, 1990, and Blackburn and Bloom, 1987). Various conclusions can be drawn 
from this literature. Generally, women’s participation in the labor market increases families’ average income. 
However, it is not clear whether this then translates into increased equality of income since this depends on the 
other family earnings. If most working women are married to low-paid men, then increases in female labor 
participation have an equalizing effect. However, if participation of women in the labor market is equally 
distributed by low-paid and high-paid husbands, then increases in female labor participation might actually increase 
income inequality. 
 
Moreover, researchers noticed that in recent years there has been a change in the family structure with increasing 
numbers of single-adult households, i.e. single working mothers. In addition, there seems to be a strong trend of 
marital educational homogamy or assortative mating, i.e. that married couples tend to have a similar education level 
and hence similar earnings. Note that the degree of assortative mating might be country specific and most studies on 
the effect of female labor participation on inequality employ evidence from the U.S., Canada and Sweden. The 
consequences of assortative mating are as follows. If high-skilled women are married to equally high-skilled men 
and if these women participate in the labor market, then through their high earnings income inequality increases 
(Karoly and Burtless, 1995, and Maxwell, 1990). This implies that only if disproportionately more low-skilled 
women participate in the labor market (than high-skilled women) will female labor participation have an equalizing 
effect on income (Esping-Andersen, 2005). For recent evidence on current trends in the EU in the labor market 
participation rates of women depending on their husbands earnings as well as on assortative mating see a recent 
OECD study (OECD, 2011, chapter 5), as well as general discussions on the relationship between earnings and 
income inequality in OECD (2011) as well as Salverda (2011, chapter 3). From the OECD report one can conclude 
that there was indeed a trend towards more assortative mating but that this contributed only moderately towards the 
rises in income inequality. The main driver of income inequality, according to the OECD, remains unequal earning 
by men (OECD, 2011, p. 194-195).  
 
In conclusion, there is neither clear theoretical nor strong empirical evidence that income inequality affects female 
labor market participation. For the reverse causation, i.e. an effect of female labor market participation on income 
inequality, the literature suggests that only if disproportionately more low-skilled women participate in the labor 
market (than high-skilled women) will female labor participation have an equalizing effect on income. 
  
4. Conclusion 
This report presents a critical reading of the literature on the impact of income inequality on important social 
outcomes related to (i) well-being, (ii) criminality, (iii) health, (iv) social capital, (v) education, (vi) political 
participation and (vii) female labor market participation. In particular, the aim of this report was to look into sound 
empirical studies - based on multivariate analysis - which examine the effect of income inequality on these 
important social outcomes. Thereby, this report provides a first step into understanding more clearly how rising 
income inequalities might affect societies and established widely accepted knowledge that inequality is a toxic 
element of today’s European societies. 
 
The upshot of this literature review is that higher criminality, reduced political agency and, to some extent, lower 
social capital formation and well-being appear to be tangible illustrations of the wastage produced by rising income 
inequality. In addition, there are a number of self-reinforcing loops linked to inequality. A clear illustration of this is 
the role of inequality in reducing the voting participation of the low income groups and the concomitant 
consequences in terms of redistributive policies and therefore on income disparities.  
 
In more detail, the literature review has highlighted the following elements: 
 
The effect of income inequality on happiness critically depends on the perceived country level of mobility. If 
income mobility is high, such as in the USA, income inequality tends to be positively associated with reported well-
being as individuals tend to consider that they will eventually reach a higher income. The opposite is observed in 
low mobile countries (i.e. typically in European countries) because in those countries individuals feel that it is 
impossible to reach a higher level of income.  
 
The majority of the studies focusing on the relationship between the income distribution and criminality conclude in 
favor of a detrimental effect of income inequality on criminal behaviors. The rationale behind these findings might 
be based on economic considerations – income inequality increases the gain derived from a criminal act –and/or on 
a sentiment of frustration of the less well-off individuals when they compare their situation with respect to the 
wealthier ones. 
 
Empirical analyses of the harmful effect of income inequality on health are usually not conclusive, at least among 
wealthier European countries. This goes in line with the fact that there is still not a widely accepted rationale for 
explaining why income inequality should impact on health and even, several scholars tend to suggest that the 
causality runs in the other way around, from health status to income inequality.  
 
In virtue to the aversion to heterogeneity theory, heterogeneous societies should be characterized by fewer contacts 
and in consequence, by lower levels of social capital. This prediction, also confirmed by adjacent theories, appears 
to be empirically validated in cross-country studies as well as in papers focusing on the US context. Findings 
specific to EU countries are limited and less conclusive. 
 
The relationship between income inequality and educational attainment might go in both directions. On one hand, 
rising inequality should encourage investments in education through increased returns to education. On the other 
hand, it might prevent these investments for those people belonging to the bottom of the income distribution 
because of resources’ constraints. Regarding the latter mechanism, the empirical studies reviewed suggest a modest 
effect or no effect of income on educational outcomes (attainment, enrollment, etc.). However, when interpreting 
these results caution is needed, because conclusions rely strongly on the econometric approach used by the 
researchers.  
 
The relationship between turnout and inequality is likely to be mutually reinforcing because, according to the class-
bias assumption, the benefits from voting are lower for the low-income group, reducing the incentive for this fringe 
of the population to vote. If voter turnout is skewed by income, the policies implemented with favor the well-off 
group (median voter hypothesis), thus participating to the intensification of income disparities. In turn, rising 
economic inequality will discourage participation among low-income groups, and so on. These predictions are 
confirmed by the majority of cross-country and single-country based studies.   
 
There is neither a sound theoretical base nor empirical evidence of an effect of income inequality on the 
participation rate of women in the labor force. The causality is found to run instead from labor participation of 
women to income inequality. 
This report is a first step of a more comprehensive project aiming at analyzing the socio-consequences of rising 
income inequalities in Europe, and will be complemented with quantitative bivariate and multivariate analyses of 
the relationship between income inequality and some of the social outcomes discussed. The empirical work will 
cover the 27 EU countries and will be carried out at the sub-national level (NUTS 1 level). 
 
The results of the literature review offer important guidelines for the succeeding quantitative step to be carried out. 
In particular, while each of the seven social outcomes reviewed in this document are important constituencies of a 
‘healthy’ society, and hence worthy of being examined in a more thorough way, it seems reasonable to restrict 
further quantitative analyses to the most relevant ones. More precisely, while the bivariate analysis will be done for 
the all social outcomes, the multivariate analysis will focus on the harmful effect of income inequality on political 
agency and criminality.  
 
The choice of these two social outcome variables for the multivariate analysis is based on two arguments. First, 
political participation and criminality constitute important proxies for the functioning of a society. Secondly, 
besides their political relevance, a clear causal relationship can be more easily postulated for these two social 
outcome variables. In particular, the multivariate analysis at the sub-national level could add substantially to the 
understanding of the social challenges caused by rising inequalities in Europe. 
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Table 7: List of the main inequality indices used in the reviewed studies  
Inequality Measure Description of the Inequality Measures 
Lorenz Curve and Gini 
Coefficient 
The Lorenz curve maps the cumulative income share on the y-axis against the 
cumulative population share ordered from the lowest income to the highest one on the 
x-axis. If the Lorenz curve is a diagonal, this implies that the distribution of income is 
distributed equally across the population. 
 
The Gini coefficient corresponds to the area between the diagonal and the Lorenz 
curve, expressed as a percentage of the area between the line of perfect equality 
(diagonal) and the line of perfect inequality (x-axis). If the area between the perfect 
equality line and the Lorenz curve is A and the area under the Lorenz curve is B, the 
Gini coefficient is A/(A+B).  
The Gini coefficient ranges between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (perfect inequality). 
Entropy indices 
Theil Coefficient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean log deviation index 
MLD 
 
The generalized entropy class of inequality measures       can be expressed as 
follows 
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where  ̅ is the mean income,    is the income of the individual/household i and n is 
the number of individuals/households. 
The parameter   in the GE class is the weight given to distances between incomes 
situated in different parts of the income distribution. With lower values of  , GE is 
more sensitive to changes in the lower tail of the distribution while higher values of   
correspond to a GE more sensitive to changes that affect the upper tail. 
 
The Theil index corresponds to entropy index with   being equal to one and is given 
by:  
            
 
 
∑(
  
 ̅
)
 
   
   
  
 ̅
  
It is possible to decompose this index into the part that is due to inequality within 
areas (i.e. regional) and the part that is due to differences between areas (i.e. between 
regions). 
The mean log deviation index (MLD) corresponds to the entropy index with   being 
equal to zero and is given by: 
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Atkinson Index The Atkinson index    is an inequality measure given by : 
     [
 
 
∑(
  
 ̅
)
   
 
   
]
 
     
 
where  ̅ is the mean income,    is the income of the individual/household i and n is 
the number of individual/households.   indicates the degree of aversion to disparity. 
When    , there is a preference for equality, i.e. an aversion to inequality. As   
rises, more weight is attached to income transfers at the lower end of the income 
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distribution and less weight to transfers at the top of the income distribution. 
The Atkinson index ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating perfect equality and 1 
maximum inequality. 
Ratio of 90/10, 80/20, 
90/50, 50/10   
The 90/10 ratio is the ratio of the average income of the richest 10 percent of the 
population divided by the average income of the bottom 10 percent. Similarly the 
80/20 ratio compares the average income of the richest 20% to the poorest 20% of the 
population. 
The same rule applies for measuring the 90/50 and 50/10 ratios. 
Robin Hood Index The Robin Hood Index is the income that would have to be redistributed (taken from 
the richer half of the population and given to the poorer half) for the society to be 
perfectly equal.  
The Robin Hood index is based on the Lorenz Curve and is equivalent to the 
maximum vertical distance between the Lorenz curve, and the perfect equality line 
(diagonal). 
The Robin Hood index RH formula is as follows:  
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where q is the number of quantiles, a is the width of the quantile,    is the income in 
the quantile j and aj is the number (absolute or relative) of income earners in the 
quantile i. ytotal is the sum of incomes of all N quantiles and atotal is the sum of the 
income earners in all N quantiles. 
The Robin Hood index ranges from 0 (complete equality) to 100 (complete 
inequality). 
Variance/coefficient of 
variation 
The variance (σ2) is a measure of how far each value in the data set is from the mean 
(dispersion) 
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where yi is the individual/household income and  ̅ is the average income and n is the 
number of individuals/households 
It is also possible to compute the coefficient of variation CV as follows: 
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In 2009, two epidemiologists, Wilkinson and Pickett, published a book entitled ‘‘The Spirit Level, Why More Equal Societies 
Almost Always Do Better’’ in which they claim that inequality and its acute perception by the average EU citizen is a toxic 
element of today’s European societies and one that seems to be associated with decreased levels of trust, civic engagement 
and participation, as well as to a host of other social challenges from poor health to crime, to underage pregnancies. Despite 
Wilkinson and Pickett’s intuitively convincing story of the link between higher income inequality and worse social outcomes, the 
empirical tests are based on simple bivariate correlations, implying that the authors fail to control for all the other numerous 
factors, which might have had an impact on both the social outcomes and income inequality. In doing so, the empirical 
associations reported in their book are likely to lead to misleading causal inferences. Nonetheless, Wilkinson and Pickett’s book 
attracted a lot of attention and called for a more careful analysis of the consequences of rising income inequality. The aim of 
this report is, hence, to look into sound empirical studies - based on multivariate analysis - which examine the effect of income 
inequality on important social outcomes related to (i) well-being, (ii) criminality, (iii) health, (iv) social capital, (v) education, (vi) 
political participation and (vii) female labor market participation. The upshot of this literature review is that higher criminality, 
reduced political agency and, to some extent, lower social capital formation and well-being appear to be tangible illustrations of 
the wastage produced by rising income inequality. In addition, there are a number of self-reinforcing loops linked to inequality. A 
clear illustration of this is the role of inequality in reducing the voting participation of the low income groups and the 
concomitant consequences in terms of redistributive policies and therefore on income disparities. 
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